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THE DEBT LIMIT AND THE CONSTITUTION:
HOW THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
FORBIDS FISCAL OBSTRUCTIONISM
JACOB D. CHARLES†
ABSTRACT
The statutory debt limit restricts the funds that can be borrowed
to meet the government’s financial obligations. On the other hand, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt Clause mandates that all the
government’s financial obligations be met. This Note argues that the
Public Debt Clause is violated when government actions create
substantial doubt about the validity of the public debt, a standard that
encompasses government actions that fall short of defaulting on or
directly repudiating the public debt. The Note proposes a test to
determine when substantial doubt is created. This substantial doubt test
analyzes the political and economic environment at the time of the
government’s actions and the subjective apprehension exhibited by debt
holders. Applying this test, this Note concludes that Congress’s actions
during the 1995–96 and 2011 debt-limit debates violated the Public
Debt Clause, though Congress’s conduct during the debate over the
debt limit in 2002 did not. And under a departmentalist understanding
of executive power, a conclusion of this nature would be the basis for
the president to ignore the debt limit when congressional actions create
unconstitutional doubt about the validity of the public debt.
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INTRODUCTION
Less than a year after Standard & Poor’s historic downgrade of
U.S. debt, Speaker of the House John Boehner declared that
Republicans would never quietly acquiesce in another increase in the
1
2
statutory debt limit. Although the statutory debt limit, sometimes
called the “debt ceiling,” has been increased under every president
3
since its codification in 1939, there has been a noticeable shift in
recent decades that has caused debt-limit legislation to meet
4
increasingly hostile opposition. And there are signs that the
opposition—and the ensuing debate—are becoming more contentious
5
with each legislative proposal. Yet one thing is clear: authorizing
such increases is a fixture of American fiscal policy. Though the
political landscape surrounding government debt has never been
completely tranquil, recent debates have been especially combative.
This Note presents a way to distinguish between constitutionally
permissible political battles and those that cross the line established
by the Public Debt Clause, by asking whether government action
creates substantial doubt about the government’s ability or
willingness to meet its financial obligations.
Since the origin of the Republic, Congress has placed limits on
6
the federal government’s borrowing authority. Before World War I,
Congress gave the executive borrowing authority only for specific

1. See Jackie Calmes, As a Debt Battle Looms, Budget Veterans See No Option but To
Raise Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2012, at A12 (recounting Speaker Boehner’s refusal to accept
another increase in the debt ceiling without a decrease in spending).
2. See 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (Supp. IV 2011) (providing the statutory debt limit), amended
by Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240.
3. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 136–39 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/hist.pdf (listing debt-limit legislation).
4. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 135, 154–57 (2005) (discussing the vitriol of recent debates).
5. See Peter Grier, Is Washington Careening Toward Another Debt Limit Crisis?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 16, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/
Decoder-Wire/2012/0516/Is-Washington-careening-toward-another-debt-limit-crisis (explaining
the polarized debate on debt-limit increases).
6. See D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31967, THE
DEBT LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 6 (2012) (“Congress has always placed
restrictions on federal debt.”); cf. Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 139–40 (“[W]hile Congress
initially maintained significant control over the conditions under which national debt could be
incurred, over time it increasingly has delegated even this authority to the Treasury
Secretary.”).
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7

actions through targeted legislation. The modern aggregated limit—
which allows the Department of the Treasury (the Treasury) to incur
8
debt on whatever terms necessary—traces back to 1939. The current
statute creates an overall ceiling on the aggregate amount of
9
government indebtedness.
The debt limit has always factored prominently in American
fiscal policy, often as a source of controversy. From its very inception
the debt limit required an increase during each year that the United
10
States was involved in World War II. And though “[c]ongressionalexecutive interactions with respect to the debt limit remained, for the
11
most part, harmonious” in the 1950s, even Republican members of
Congress were not sanguine about the prospect of increasing the debt
12
limit as often as President Eisenhower desired. The administrations
of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson faced strident opposition to debtlimit increases during what had been, in comparison, fairly routine
13
votes under Eisenhower. This conflict was partly a function of the
14
increasing frequency of debt-limit increases and partly a result of
7. Id. at 5; see also, e.g., Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1302, 32 Stat. 481 (repealed) (authorizing
the incurrence of debt for construction of the Panama Canal). The first major statutory limit on
debt was codified in the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, ch. 56, 40 Stat. 288 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (Supp. IV 2011)), amended by Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240, which placed different restrictions on different types of debt, id. §§ 1,
5, 40 Stat. at 288, 290–91.
8. See H.J. Cooke & M. Katzen, The Public Debt Limit, 9 J. FIN. 298, 300 (1954)
(“[T]he . . . $45 billion combined limit automatically became the first over-all limitation on the
size of the public debt with a general application to all principal types of securities; only a
relatively small amount of minor issues were excluded.”).
9. See 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (Supp. IV 2011), amended by Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub.
L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (“The face amount of obligations issued under this chapter and the
face amount of obligations whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the United States
Government (except guaranteed obligations held by the Secretary of the Treasury) may not be
more than $14,294,000,000,000 outstanding at one time . . . .”).
10. See Public Debt Act of 1944, ch. 240, 58 Stat. 272; Public Debt Act of 1943, ch. 52, 57
Stat. 63; Public Debt Act of 1942, ch. 205, 56 Stat. 189; Public Debt Act of 1941, ch. 7, 55 Stat. 7
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (Supp. IV 2011)), amended by Budget Control Act of
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240; supra note 3 and accompanying text.
11. Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 150.
12. See Linda K. Kowalcky & Lance T. LeLoup, Congress and the Politics of Statutory Debt
Limitation, 53 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 14, 16–17 (1993) (outlining mounting Republican disapproval
over the course of several debt-limit votes).
13. See Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 152 (noting that both Democrats and Republicans
“began using votes on debt limit increase requests as occasions to attack the fiscal policy of the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations”).
14. See AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 6, at 8 (“After 1954, the debt limit was reduced twice
and increased seven times, until March 1962 . . . . Since March 1962, Congress has enacted 76
separate measures that have altered the limit on federal debt.”). One reason debt-limit
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disagreement over the ideological presuppositions of Keynesian
economic theory, which heralded budget deficits as effective
15
economic stimuli.
In the 1970s, the debt limit began to be used as more than a mere
ceiling on governmental borrowing authority. Throughout the Ford
and Carter administrations, the trend of “us[ing] . . . the debt ceiling
16
vote as a vehicle for other legislative matters” developed. In
particular, members of the minority party increasingly amended debtlimit legislation—often with entirely nongermane proposals—to
17
ensure that they received something from their acquiescence. This
18
trend continued into the Reagan administration in the 1980s, during
19
which the executive-congressional relationship soured even further.
And after Reagan-era budget reforms turned out to be ineffective,
spending under the first President Bush—necessitated by, among
other things, the Gulf War and the savings-and-loan bailout—
20
required more frequent increases.
Comparatively few debt-limit increases were necessary during
21
the next few decades, though some of the increases that were
required triggered intense debate. After four consecutive years of
budget surpluses in his second term, President Clinton left office
“grandly proclaim[ing] in 1999 that the entire $5.6 trillion national
22
debt could be paid off by 2015.” Unfortunately, the external shocks
23
during President George W. Bush’s administration required that the
increases have become more frequent is that the debt limit is not tied to inflation. Therefore,
even if no deficits grew the debt for decades, the nominal dollar-denominated debt limit would
still need to increase to keep pace with inflation. Ezra Klein, Suspending the Debt Ceiling Is a
Great Idea. Let’s Do It Forever!, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Jan. 22, 2013, 1:52 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/22/suspending-the-debt-ceiling-isa-great-idea-lets-do-it-forever/.
15. See Kowalcky & LeLoup, supra note 12, at 17–18 (laying out the contours of Keynesian
theory and its impact on debt-limit debates).
16. Id. at 18.
17. See id. at 19 (“Proposed amendments were not new to debt limit legislation; the
difference was in their germaneness to the issue.”).
18. Id. at 18.
19. See Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 154 (“The [1980s] also wrought noticeable shifts in
Congress’s use of the debt limit statute.”).
20. ANDREW L. YARROW, FORGIVE US OUR DEBTS: THE INTERGENERATIONAL
DANGERS OF FISCAL IRRESPONSIBILITY 44 (2008).
21. See supra note 3.
22. YARROW, supra note 20, at 46.
23. See id. at 47 (“[T]he dot.com boom turned into a stock-market collapse; the United
States was attacked by terrorists, leading to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; and a mild recession
depressed incomes and federal revenues.”).
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debt limit be increased three times in slightly more than two years.
Some of these debates at the outset of President Bush’s first term
25
were acrimonious; the increases that were passed during his second
26
term “took a less dramatic path.” In stark contrast, the increases
under President Obama took the opposite route—uncontroversial at
27
first and then involving fierce political struggles as his term wore on.
This Note demonstrates the relevance of Section 4 of the
28
Fourteenth Amendment (the Public Debt Clause) to congressional
conduct concerning the statutory debt limit. It argues that Congress
has acted unconstitutionally during debates over raising the debt limit
by causing the validity of the public debt to be questioned in violation
of the Public Debt Clause. Two notable commentators who
comprehensively examined the scope of the Public Debt Clause did
not relate its broad commands to congressional inaction in the face of
29
an unyielding debt limit. Nor has the recent literature created a
systematic method to determine when the Public Debt Clause is
30
violated. Filling that void, this Note develops, elaborates, and
applies a test to decipher the boundaries of the Public Debt Clause—
and concludes that Congress has violated the Public Debt Clause on
31
at least two separate occasions.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the drafting
history of the Public Debt Clause. Part II then analyzes its meaning,
concluding that actions short of direct repudiation or actual default—
24. Act of Nov. 19, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-415, 118 Stat. 2337; Act of May 27, 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-24, 117 Stat. 710; Act of June 28, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-199, 116 Stat. 734 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (Supp. IV 2011)), amended by Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240.
25. See AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 6, at 14–16 (outlining the difficulty in passing debtlimit legislation between 2002 and 2006).
26. Id. at 16.
27. See infra Part IV.B.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (“The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.”).
29. See generally Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment
Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561 (1997) (discussing use of the Public Debt Clause to enforce a balanced
budget); P.J. Eder, A Forgotten Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 1
(1933) (arguing that the Public Debt Clause should forbid discarding the gold standard).
30. Cf. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How To Choose the Least Unconstitutional
Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the 2011 Debt Ceiling Standoff, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 1175, 1180–81, 1243 (2012) (assuming that the “realistic options were all
unconstitutional,” and then arguing that the “least unconstitutional” option was for the
president to ignore the debt limit).
31. See infra Parts III–IV.
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actions that create substantial doubt—may constitute an
unconstitutional questioning of the debt. Next, Part III proposes a
legal standard to govern the Public Debt Clause, the substantial doubt
test, which focuses on (1) the political and economic context in which
certain congressional conduct occurs, and (2) the subjective debtholder apprehension caused by the government’s actions. Part IV
then applies the test to several recent debt-limit debates, finding
congressional actions during the 1995–96 and 2011 debates to be
unconstitutional.
Assuming a departmentalist account of executive power, when
the Public Debt Clause is violated by congressional actions that place
the debt’s validity in substantial doubt, the president can refuse to
32
enforce—that is, refuse “to carry into effect” —the debt limit and
order the Treasury Secretary to continue borrowing funds to meet the
government’s obligations. This authority is not an imperial power, but
a solemn duty—a requirement that the president refuse to allow
33
Congress to violate the Constitution. In the end, whether the
departmentalist description of executive power is correct or not, there
can be little doubt that at least some congressional actions have
34
violated the Public Debt Clause. And this should be troubling to all.

32. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1284–85 (1996) (arguing that the executive is the sole
branch able “to carry into effect federal statutes”).
33. The debate over executive disregard is beyond the scope of this Note, but the argument
here is that if the president does have the authority to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws,
then the president could exercise this authority to ignore the debt limit when the limit is applied
unconstitutionally. Compare, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 905, 909–11, 913–14 (1990) (arguing that the executive branch can—and should—have
its own constitutional interpretation), and Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty
To Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008) (making textual, structural, and
historical arguments for the president’s power to disregard unconstitutional laws), with Eugene
Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381, 381 (1986) (“In our constitutional
system of government, such a refusal by the Executive to ‘take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed’ cannot and must not be tolerated.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)), and
Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 997–98 (1994) (setting forth strict standards for
determining when, if ever, a president can refuse to enforce a law).
34. See infra Part IV.
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I. THE DRAFTING AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DEBT
CLAUSE
The Fourteenth Amendment has a long, complex, and
35
controversial history. It is clear, however, that a central goal of the
amendment was to ensure that if and when Southerners were
readmitted to the Union and to elected office, they could not undo
36
the results of the Civil War. This protection was necessary because
as a consequence of emancipation and the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the South and its interests would receive increased
representation in Congress, a fact that did not sit well with many loyal
37
Unionists.
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Public Debt
Clause, proclaims that “[t]he validity of the public debt of the United
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or
38
rebellion, shall not be questioned.” In the drafting process, the
Public Debt Clause underwent a noteworthy evolution that has been
39
largely unexamined in the secondary literature. Most of the floor
debate about the proposed amendment focused, as one would expect,
on more pressing matters, such as the contours of equal protection
40
and the nature of the citizenship guarantee. In fact, early versions of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not include a public debt clause at
41
all, and little was said about the language in Congress when a debt
42
clause was introduced. The meager discussions that did take place,
35. See generally WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1–12 (1988).
36. Charles E. Chadsey, The Fourteenth Amendment, 1 U. COLO. STUD. 197, 198 (1903)
(“As the Constitution then stood, there would be nothing to prevent these states [in the South]
from legally reversing all their actions . . . . Therefore good politics demanded that the
Constitution be amended so as to prevent the most serious of the dangers which they believed
threatened them.”).
37. See WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
1865–1877, at 53–54 (1907) (“That the result of the war should be an accession of influence in
Congress to the South, was a proposition which few northerners could contemplate with entire
equanimity.”).
38. To simplify matters, this Note speaks of Section 4 simpliciter referring only to the first
sentence—the Public Debt Clause.
39. Only three legal scholars discuss the Public Debt Clause in any appreciable depth. See
supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
40. Eder, supra note 29, at 4.
41. NELSON, supra note 35, at 49.
42. See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 582 (“The Public Debt Clause emerged not from a
congressional debate about the dynamics of the Fiscal Constitution, but from a Thirty-Ninth
Congress focused on reconstructing a war-ravaged nation. It is not surprising then that no
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however, are best understood in the context of the Public Debt
43
Clause’s evolution. Because the evolution of the Public Debt Clause
is key to understanding its meaning, this Part explores the drafting
44
history before turning in Part II to analyze the final text.
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction was tasked with
determining the conditions under which the rebel states could be
readmitted to the Union and whether current representatives from
45
these states would be recognized as full members of Congress.
Importantly, it also took responsibility for drafting the Fourteenth
46
Amendment. On April 30, 1866, the proposal adopted by the Joint
47
Committee was reported to the full House and Senate. In the fourth
section, it read:
Neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any
debt or obligation already incurred, or which may hereafter be
incurred, in aid of insurrection or of war against the United States,
or any claim for compensation for loss of involuntary service or
48
labor.

After the House passed this version of Section 4 on May 10, the
49
Senate began debate.
Then, on May 23, Republican Senator Benjamin Wade offered a
revision to this section, which read:
The public debt of the United States, including all debts or
obligations which have been or may hereafter be incurred in
suppressing insurrection or in carrying on war in defense of the
Union, or for payment of bounties or pensions incident to such war
and provided for by the law, shall be inviolable. But debts or
obligations which have been or may hereafter be incurred in aid of
insurrection or of war against the United States, and claims of

member of the House or Senate commented for the record on the Clause’s consequences for
posterity.” (footnotes omitted)).
43. See id. (examining the legislative history).
44. This is not, of course, to say that the debates in Congress are more important to the
meaning of the Public Debt Clause than its text. This Note treats the drafting history first
merely because it is logically and temporally prior to the final enactment and itself informs the
analysis of the text.
45. See DUNNING, supra note 37, at 51–53.
46. Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise—Section One in
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933, 934 (1984).
47. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 115 (1956).
48. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Sen. John Bingham).
49. JAMES, supra note 47, at 129–31.
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compensation for loss of involuntary service or labor, shall not be
50
assumed or paid by any State nor by the United States.

Though this revision took the further and substantial step of
protecting the Union debt as well as repudiating the Confederate
51
debt, it was uncontroversial. Although it was ultimately withdrawn
52
before it came to a vote, the Wade amendment is significant for a
53
number of reasons. First, it made the initial suggestion that the debt
54
of the United States should be protected in the Constitution.
Second, its language is so similar to the final version that it sheds light
55
on the latter’s meaning. Third, it created the most discussion about
56
the need for a provision protecting the national debt. And finally,
given Senator Wade’s importance in the 39th Congress, his views
57
represented what many congressional Republicans likely believed.
When he proposed his amendment to the Public Debt Clause,
Senator Wade spoke at length about the necessity of protecting the
58
Union debt. His proposal went, he argued, “to another branch of
this business almost as essential” as repudiating the Confederate
59
debt. His revision would “put[] the debt incurred in the civil war on
our part under the guardianship of the Constitution of the United
60
States, so that a Congress cannot repudiate it.” Significantly, he
thought it would “be of incalculable pecuniary benefit to the United

50. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade).
51. See Eder, supra note 29, at 5–6 (discussing widespread agreement on these principles).
52. See infra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
53. See generally Jack M. Balkin, More on the Original Meaning of Section Four of the
Fourteenth Amendment, BALKINIZATION (July 2, 2011, 9:55 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2011/07/more-on-original-meaning-of-section.html (discussing the importance of Senator
Wade).
54. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768–70 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin
Wade) (emphasizing the need for constitutional protection of the national debt).
55. See id. at 2768, 3040 (statements of Sen. Benjamin Wade and Sen. Daniel Clark) (listing
both versions of the Public Debt Clause).
56. See id. at 2768–70 (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade).
57. See Balkin, supra note 53 (“Ben Wade was not just any senator. He was a key
Republican leader during this period—the leader of the Radical Republicans, in fact—and was
soon to be elected President pro tempore of the Senate. . . . Thus, when Wade spoke, he was
speaking as the leader of the Radical faction, and not simply as some nondescript backbencher.”).
58. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768–70 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin
Wade).
59. Id. at 2769 (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade).
60. Id.
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61

States.” For Senator Wade, the reason it would benefit the United
States was a simple matter of economics:
I have no doubt that every man who has property in the public funds
will feel safer when he sees that the national debt is withdrawn from
the power of a Congress to repudiate it and placed under the
guardianship of the Constitution than he would feel if it were left at
loose ends and subject to the varying majorities which may arise in
62
Congress.

Necessity demanded that the debt be protected by the Constitution
because, as Senator Wade noted, when the Southerners returned to
Congress, it would be hard to “guaranty that the debts of the
Government will be paid, or that your soldiers and the widows of
63
your soldiers will not lose their pensions.” Unfortunately, there is no
recorded explanation for why Senator Wade’s language was altered in
64
the next, and penultimate, draft.
Nonetheless, Senator Wade’s comments illustrate the very vivid
fear among congressional Republicans that Southern Democrats
65
would return to Congress and repudiate the Union debt. Indeed,
66
there had been cries in the South to do just that. For instance, on
September 22, 1865—less than a year before ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment—the Liberator printed a speech by Senator
Charles Sumner recounting the ominous words of an unnamed
Virginian Democratic congressional candidate: “I am opposed to the
Southern States being taxed for the redemption of this [Union] debt,
67
either directly or indirectly.” Not only was the quoted candidate
ideologically opposed to the idea, but he also vowed to act on his
opposition: “[I]f elected to Congress, I will oppose all such measures,
and I will vote to repeal all laws that have heretofore been passed for
that purpose; and, in doing so, I do not consider that I violate any
68
obligation to which the South was a party.” The candidate concluded
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Eder, supra note 29, at 5–6 (indicating the limited discussion about the replacement
of the Wade amendment).
65. Senator Charles Sumner, Speech at the Republican State Convention, reprinted in The
National Security and the National Faith: Guarantees Needed for the National Freedman and the
National Creditor, LIBERATOR, Sep. 22, 1865, at 35.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting the unnamed candidate).
68. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting the unnamed candidate).
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that as far as he was concerned, the South “never plighted [its] faith
69
for the redemption of the war debt.” It is unsurprising, then, that
70
Senate Republicans never questioned Senator Wade’s proposal.
Protecting the Union debt was the logical counterpart to the
71
unquestioned repudiation of the Confederate debt.
72
Senator Wade withdrew his proposed revision after an
alternative version was agreed to in the Senate Republican Caucus
73
74
and introduced on May 29. The new version read as follows:
[Section 4:] The obligations of the United States incurred in
suppressing insurrection, or in defense of the Union, or for payment
of bounties or pensions incident thereto, shall remain inviolate.
[Section 5:] Neither the United States nor any State shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection [or]
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for compensation
for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts,
75
obligations, and claims shall be forever held illegal and void.

There was little discussion about this replacement to the Wade
amendment because it was largely accomplished during a closed-door
76
Republican Senate caucus. Some Democrats, however, did question
this section. “Who,” asked Senator Thomas Hendricks, “has asked us
77
to change the Constitution for the benefit of the bond-holders?”
Rather than secure the national debt, Senator Hendricks feared that
“[a] provision like this . . . would excite distrust, and cast a shade on

69. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting the unnamed candidate).
70. Eder, supra note 29, at 5–6.
71. Indeed, even President Andrew Johnson urged the Southern states to repudiate their
own war debt. See, e.g., Andrew Johnson, The Rebel War Debts: Important Dispatch from
President Johnson, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1865, at 1 (reporting President Johnson’s demand to
North Carolina’s provisional governor that “[e]very dollar of the State debt created to aid the
rebellion against the United States should be repudiated, finally and forever”).
72. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2869 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade).
73. JAMES, supra note 47, at 140–42.
74. The original proposal was to split the section and call the first sentence Section 4 and
the second sentence Section 5. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2869 (1866) (statement
of Sen. Jacob Howard).
75. See id. at 2869, 2941 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard). This language was
reconstructed from the Congressional Globe’s record of revisions suggested by Senator Howard,
who made a series of proposals to modify the text, such as “strike out the word ‘already,’ in line
thirty-four.” Later, “any claim for compensation for” was changed to “any claim on account of.”
Id. at 2941 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. JAMES, supra note 47, at 140–41 (discussing the caucus’s work).
77. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2938, 2940 (1866) (statement of Sen. Thomas
Hendricks).
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public credit.” Recall, however, that the May 29 version only
guaranteed “[t]he obligations of the United States incurred in
suppressing insurrection, or in defense of the Union, or for payment
79
of bounties or pensions incident thereto.” This version of Section 4
was not a blanket protection of national debt but a limited protection
of Civil War debt only.
On June 4, Republican Senator William Fessenden worried that
“[t]here is a little obscurity, or, at any rate, the expression in section
four might be construed to go further than was intended, and I have
rather come to the conclusion that it was best to put sections four and
80
five in one single section.” But he gave no further elaboration about
81
the defects of the fourth section as it then stood. In fact, the final
revision of the clause that came to be the Public Debt Clause
broadened the language of the previous proposal; it did not
82
circumscribe it. Though originally intent on offering an amendment
to cure the defects that he perceived, Senator Fessenden did not offer
83
one, and it is unclear what exact revision he desired. There is no
surviving record of his unoffered amendment, and no further
discussion on the matter ensued until the day of the final Senate
84
vote.
Finally, on June 8, perhaps following Senator Fessenden’s
criticism of the obscurity of the two debt sections, Senator Daniel
Clark offered an amendment combining Sections 4 and 5 into the
85
final version of the current Section 4. Significantly, however, when
questioned about whether his revision “changes at all the effect of the
86
fourth and fifth sections,” Senator Clark stated that “[t]he result is

78. Id. at 2940 (statement of Sen. Thomas Hendricks).
79. Id. at 2869 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard).
80. Id. at 2941 (statement of Sen. William Fessenden).
81. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1866) (demonstrating that Senator
Fessenden chose to withhold his amendment at that time and did not suggest any further
changes to Section 4).
82. For a comparison of the final text of the Public Debt Clause and the text of the
previous proposal, see supra notes 28, 75 and accompanying text.
83. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1866) (statement of Sen. William
Fessenden).
84. See id. (“I will omit offering my amendment . . . until the resolution is reported to the
Senate.”).
85. Id. at 2869 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard); id. at 2941, 3040, 3042 (statement of Sen.
William Fessenden).
86. Id. at 3040 (statement of Sen. Reverdy Johnson).
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87

the same” as that of the May 29 Caucus proposal. The revision was
88
then approved without another recorded word, and the House
89
concurred in the Senate’s revisions to the amendment.
Despite Senator Clark’s comments, there are significant
differences between the final three versions. Senator Wade’s May 23
proposal, like the final version, protected the national debt broadly
90
and said that it “shall be inviolable.” The subsequent version (the
May 29 Caucus proposal), guaranteed only the debt that had been
“incurred in suppressing insurrection, or in defense of the Union, or
91
for payment of bounties or pensions incident thereto,” and it
92
declared that only this debt “shall remain inviolate.” The final,
adopted version harkened back to Senator Wade’s proposal by
protecting the national debt broadly, but instead the revised text said
93
that the public debt “shall not be questioned.” It is curious, then,
that Senator Clark could maintain that the final version changed
94
nothing from the penultimate version.
Whatever may be made of Senator Clark’s comment, the final
version of the Public Debt Clause had more in common with the
Wade proposal than with its immediate predecessor because it
encompassed the general national debt within its purview. In less than
six weeks, the Public Debt Clause went from simply repudiating the
debt of the Southern States to protecting the debt of the United

87. Id. at 2869, 3040 (statement of Sen. Daniel Clark).
88. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3040 (1866).
89. Id. at 3148–49.
90. See id. at 2768 (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade) (containing the text of the
amendment, which protects “[t]he public debt of the United States”).
91. Id. at 2869 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2768, 3040 (1866) (statements of Sen. Benjamin Wade and Sen. James Doolittle)
(demonstrating that both versions of the amendment protected “the public debt of the United
States”).
94. Id. at 3040 (statement of Sen. Daniel Clark). For attempts to explain these comments,
see, for example, Eder, supra note 29, at 8, which suggests that Senator Clark’s comment was “a
mere passing remark, not fully weighed, and of little consequence as a guide to interpretation.”
In addition, Professor Michael Abramowicz gives three reasons to disregard Senator Clark’s
comment: (1) “stylistic changes in constitutional provisions are not generally assumed to be
without substantive content,” so the change likely mattered; (2) the comment “may merely
indicate that the [two] versions would have the same result for the purposes of Reconstruction”;
and (3) “the Senate [later] rejected a subsequent proposal to revert” back to the previous
language, so it seems logical to conclude that there was something about the change that the
Senate preferred. See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 584–85.
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States as a whole. Though important and consequential, these
96
changes were little discussed. There was near-unanimous agreement
on the original language presented to the House by the Joint
97
Committee.
Though the legislative history can help illuminate the scope of
the Public Debt Clause, this history is only one step in determining
the extent of its application. Nevertheless, the legislative history
suggests that the Public Debt Clause was meant to encompass the
public debt of the United States generally, not only the debt incurred
in the Civil War, and was, at least in part, designed to put the public
debt above the vagaries of partisan politics.
II. THE MEANING OF THE PUBLIC DEBT CLAUSE: DETERMINING
THE NATURE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDUCT
Recall that the final text of the Public Debt Clause, adopted by
98
both chambers of Congress and ratified by the states, reads: “The
validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
99
questioned.” Though hardly any of these terms are unambiguous, a
general understanding of the Framers and their audience helps
inform the debate about the Public Debt Clause’s continuing
100
relevance. Thus, in addition to the drafting history, this Note draws
on the public meaning of the clause at the time of enactment and
101
ratification. Together with insights from modern commentators, the
original public meaning sheds new light on the continued vitality of
the Public Debt Clause. In particular, the text and historic
understanding suggest that actions by the government that create
95. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (statement of Sen. John Bingham) (1866);
id. at 3148 (statement of Sen. Thaddeus Stevens) (listing the first and last versions of the
section).
96. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
97. See Eder, supra note 29, at 4–5 (“To this principle there was no opposition.”).
98. The Fourteenth Amendment was declared to be ratified on July 21, 1868. Id. at 12.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
100. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1130–31 (2003) (advocating for the use
of originalism in interpreting the Constitution).
101. This approach suggests that constitutional inquiry involves “faithful application of the
words and phrases of the text in accordance with the meaning they would have had at the time
they were adopted as law, within the political and linguistic community that adopted the text as
law.” Id. at 1131.
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substantial doubt about the validity of the public debt—actions short
of direct repudiation or outright default—are unconstitutional.
A. Problems with Stopping at Repudiation or Default
The central uncertainty with the Public Debt Clause is defining
the nature of conduct that constitutes an impermissible questioning of
102
the public debt. At least three different levels of action could be
prohibited by the Public Debt Clause’s proscription of questioning:
(1) repudiation, (2) default, or (3) some actions short of default. If
level (1) accurately describes the Public Debt Clause’s prohibition,
then the only conduct that would trigger the Public Debt Clause is an
outright official declaration of repudiation. Stated another way, only
repudiating the debt would violate the demand that “the public
debt . . . shall not be questioned.” On the other hand, if default—
level (2)—is what the Public Debt Clause prohibits, then repudiation
would still be unconstitutional because it is a more drastic disregard
103
of financial obligations than default, but so would the step prior to
repudiation—a missed government payment on its debt (that is,
default). Finally, if the correct reading of the Public Debt Clause
encompasses some lesser conduct—level (3)—then both repudiation
and default are also prohibited, but some government action that
precedes both default and repudiation would also be unconstitutional.
This lower level of government action includes conduct that creates
pervasive lack of confidence in the government’s ability to meet its
obligations by generating widespread doubt about the validity of the
public debt.
This Note argues that both default and repudiation are
inappropriate stopping points and that something lesser, something
within level (3), accurately describes the scope of the Public Debt
Clause’s prohibition. This Part argues that reading the Public Debt
Clause to prohibit actions that create substantial doubt about the
public debt’s validity—a level higher than reasonable doubt, simple
doubt, or mere decreased confidence—best serves the language,
history, and purposes of the Public Debt Clause and strikes the

102. See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 589–90 (discussing the importance of this inquiry);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (“The validity of the public debt of the United
States . . . shall not be questioned.”).
103. See Shelagh A. Heffernan, Country Risk Analysis: The Demand and Supply of
Sovereign Loans, 4 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 389, 405–06 (1985) (recognizing that the costs of
repudiation are drastic).
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proper balance between debtholder protection and the necessary
104
Several
political latitude for congressional policymaking.
considerations support a reading of “questioned” that equates it with
actions that induce substantial doubt.
First, the logic of the Public Debt Clause supports a broader
reading than repudiation—level (1). Interpreting the Public Debt
Clause to only prohibit repudiation would disregard its broad
language. Repudiation cannot cause any kind of questioning. If
Congress repudiates the public debt, there is no validity left to
question; there is nothing to doubt, for “[r]epudiation is a sovereign
105
government declaration that its debt is invalid.” In other words, if
repudiation was all that the original Congress was concerned with,
then a word like “questioned,” with graded shades of meaning, was
surely ill chosen. It would be a straightforward inquiry in every case
to discover if the debt is valid: simply ask whether Congress had
repudiated it. The Public Debt Clause could have encompassed this
idea more simply by stating that “the public debt is now and shall
forever be valid.” But the validity of the debt is not questioned when
106
the debt is repudiated, the validity of the debt is voided.
Moreover, in speaking about the purpose of including a debt
clause at all, Senator Wade declared his conviction “that every man
who has property in the public funds will feel safer when he sees that
the national debt is withdrawn from the power of a Congress to
107
repudiate it and placed under the guardianship of the Constitution.”
Though speaking expressly of repudiation, the reasoning behind
Senator Wade’s comment applies equally to conduct short of
repudiation—one who has invested in public funds would likely be
just as dismayed to find that Congress will only occasionally pay him
interest on time. The “guardianship of the Constitution” enables the
debt holder to feel more secure “than he would feel if [the national
debt] were left at loose ends and subject to the varying majorities

104. If an even lower level more adequately and accurately represents the Public Debt
Clause, it only buttresses the central argument of this Note. This Note’s argument only depends
on a rejection of either repudiation or default as a point at which to stop the analysis.
105. BENJAMIN J. COHEN & FABIO BASAGNI, BANKS AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS:
PRIVATE LENDING IN THE INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 104 (1981) (emphasis
added) (quoting Henry Simon Bloch, Foreign Risk Judgment for Commercial Banks, 160
BANKERS MAG. 90, 93 (1977)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
106. Id.
107. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2769 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade).
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108

which may arise in Congress.” The “varying majorities” in Congress
held enormous sway over the validity of the public debt prior to the
109
Civil War, and the Public Debt Clause was meant to dramatically
110
reduce this power. The prohibition on questioning the validity of
the debt should, then, extend to actions short of repudiation.
The case of default presents a more difficult question. For any
Treasury security, “[d]efault . . . occurs when payment on that bond is
111
missed.” As with repudiation, the inquiry for default is a simple
process: check to see whether the government has missed any
payments on its debt. Although the simplicity of this inquiry weighs
against equating questioning with default (as it did for equating
questioning with repudiation), default might nonetheless cause the
requisite questioning of future debt payments. So, although default is
quite likely impermissible under the Public Debt Clause, the issue is
whether any conduct short of default can cause the relevant type of
questioning. Default only occurs when the government has missed
112
payment on one of its legal obligations. A debtholder might surely
question the payment of the government’s subsequent legal
obligations once a payment is missed. But a host of government
actions short of default might cause a widespread and pervasive lack
of trust in the ability (or willingness) of the government to fulfill its
113
obligations. There are multiple indications that the Public Debt
Clause was meant to prohibit these lower-level actions as well.
B. Reasons for Drawing the Line at the Level of Substantial Doubt
1. Textual Reasons To Prefer Substantial Doubt. At the time of
the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, “to
question” meant “to doubt; to be uncertain of; to have no confidence

108. Id.
109. Cf. Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 139 (“Congress initially maintained significant
control over the conditions under which national debt could be incurred . . . .”).
110. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2769 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade).
111. PHILIPPE JORION, FINANCIAL RISK MANAGER HANDBOOK 452 (5th ed. 2009); see also
Neil H. Buchanan, Some Further Thoughts About the Debt Limit, DORF ON LAW (July 15,
2011), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/07/some-further-thoughts-about-debt-limit.html (“Not
making legally required payments is, under both common sense and the law, defaulting.”).
112. JORION, supra note 111, at 452.
113. For instance, rhetoric about the refusal to raise the debt limit could very well engender
fears that the government may not continue to meet its obligations. E.g., Simon Johnson, The
Debt Ceiling and Playing with Fire, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Jan. 24, 2013, 5:00 A.M.),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/the-debt-ceiling-and-playing-with-fire.
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114

in; to mention as not to be trusted.” To question meant that one
115
could “doubt, . . . controvert, [or] dispute” the validity of the debt.
To have a question about the debt was to quite simply have a “doubt”
116
about it. Moreover, something with “validity” was said to have
117
118
“legal force” or the “force to convince; certainty; value.” By
preserving the validity of the debt, the Public Debt Clause protects
119
the debt from actions that would cause the debt to lose “value” or
120
would cause debt holders to lose “certainty” in the obligations of
the United States. The Public Debt Clause does not simply protect
the actual debt (from, for example, default or repudiation), but, by
121
protecting the debt’s “validity,”
it guards against certain
122
diminutions in the public debt’s value or reductions in the certainty
123
of its repayment as well. These textual indicia support the argument
that, by using the word “questioned,” Congress meant to do more
than just guard against default or repudiation.
2. Historical Reasons To Prefer Substantial Doubt. There are
also historical and contextual reasons to think that the Public Debt
Clause forbids not just repudiation or default, but also the kind of
actions that would cause debt holders to have substantial doubt about
the validity of the debt. In his 1901 Constitutional History of the
124
United States, Professor Francis Newton Thorpe notes the breadth
with which the Public Debt Clause was interpreted during the
ratification process:
The national debt . . . was held chiefly at the North, and its
repudiation, or diminution in value, or any distrust of its obligation,

114. SAMUEL JOHNSON & JOHN WALKER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
587 (1827).
115. SAMUEL FALLOWS, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS AND ANTONYMS 212
(1898).
116. See NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 348 (1831)
(defining “Quest’-ion” as “act of asking, interrogatory, inquiry, dispute, doubt”).
117. Id. at 488.
118. JOHNSON & WALKER, supra note 114, at 764.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (“The validity of the public debt of the United
States . . , shall not be questioned.”).
122. See, e.g., 3 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 297 (1901) (recounting widespread views about the sanctity of the debt).
123. JOHNSON & WALKER, supra note 114, at 764.
124. THORPE, supra note 122.
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would affect most disastrously the lives and fortunes of the Northern
people and would injure our national credit abroad. Its validity was
essential to our prosperity, however great the burden of payment
125
might prove to be.

Professor Thorpe reports that “validity”—the aspect of the debt
that “shall not be questioned”—was equated with “diminution of
value” or “any distrust” of the government’s obligations. This kind of
diminution and distrust could occur prior to, and apart from, default
126
or repudiation. Indeed, Professor Thorpe expressly declares that
more than mere repudiation was contemplated by the drafters of the
127
Public Debt Clause. Diminution and distrust would be triggered by
government conduct that caused debt holders “to doubt” or “to be
128
uncertain of” the validity of the debt.
129
This sentiment was widely held at the time. The 1866 National
Union Convention in Pennsylvania adopted a resolution declaring
that the convention “h[e]ld the debt of the nation to be sacred and
inviolable; and . . . proclaim[ed] [its] purpose in discharging this, as in
performing all other national obligations, to maintain unimpaired and
130
unimpeached the honor and the faith of the Republic.” It was so
important to protect the debt at this time that simply proscribing
default or repudiation would not go far enough. In 1933, Professor
P.J. Eder argued that the Public Debt Clause was designed “to lay
down a constitutional canon for all time in order to protect and
maintain the national honor and to strengthen the national credit”
and was “clearly proposed also to establish a perpetual dike against
131
momentary waves of inflation and repudiation, total or partial.” The

125. Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
126. See Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 175 (“[T]he debt limit has been criticized for
creating situations that threaten the credit and financial standing of the United States
government. . . . The threat of default, even absent actual default, is said to cause market
uncertainty regarding the United States’ ability to honor its financial obligations and
accordingly to cost (or threaten to cost) the nation in elevated premiums and yield rates.”).
127. THORPE, supra note 122, at 297 (stating that “repudiation or diminution in value, or
any distrust of its obligation” would be detrimental to the Union (emphasis added)).
128. See JOHNSON & WALKER, supra note 114, at 587 (defining “to question” as, inter alia,
“to doubt; to be uncertain of”).
129. Eder, supra note 29, at 10.
130. Id. (quoting the Resolution of the Philadelphia Fourteenth of August Convention)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
131. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
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Public Debt Clause, in sum, was meant to be a bulwark against the
132
vacillation of the political branches.
3. Precedential Reasons To Prefer Substantial Doubt. In its only
analysis of the Public Debt Clause, the Supreme Court confirmed the
133
breadth of the sweeping language. In Perry v. United States, the
Court recognized that the Public Debt Clause provides robust
protection for the government’s obligations, stating that “[w]hile this
provision was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond
question the obligations of the Government issued during the Civil
134
War, its language indicates a broader connotation.” This broader
connotation was for the Court “confirmatory of a fundamental
135
principle” that applied to all government bonds—including those
issued before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.
Strikingly, the Court hinted that the Public Debt Clause may stretch
even beyond formal Treasury securities: “Nor can we perceive any
reason for not considering the expression ‘the validity of the public
debt’ as embracing whatever concerns the integrity of the public
136
obligations.”
The Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements about the
137
“fundamental principle” enshrined in the Public Debt Clause and its
application to “whatever concerns the integrity of the public
138
obligations” suggest that the Public Debt Clause should be read to
prohibit some conduct that falls short of outright repudiation or
actual default. Indeed, it should be read to proscribe action that puts
the validity of the debt into substantial doubt. Some doubt—some
loss of confidence—may be impossible to eradicate. But when the
government’s actions create substantial doubt, these actions cause an
139
unconstitutional questioning of the validity of the national debt.

132. See Jack M. Balkin, The Legislative History of Section Four of the Fourteenth
Amendment, BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2011, 1:59 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/
legislative-history-of-section-four-of.html (discussing the purpose of the Public Debt Clause).
133. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
134. Id. at 354.
135. Id.
136. Id. (second emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 592 (“[T]he literal interpretation of the Clause is
that a governmental action making uncertain whether or not a debt will be honored is
unconstitutional.”); Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 30, at 1191–93 (stressing that the Public Debt
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III. VIOLATIONS OF THE PUBLIC DEBT CLAUSE: DEVELOPING THE
SUBSTANTIAL DOUBT TEST
The Public Debt Clause, then, should be interpreted broadly to
protect not just debt incurred during the Civil War, but all
government debt obligations. Nor should the Public Debt Clause be
read to simply preserve the public debt from repudiation or default
alone. Properly read, it protects all legally authorized government
obligations from actions that create substantial doubt about their
validity. But recognizing that the Public Debt Clause prohibits actions
that create substantial doubt is of limited value without a means to
assess whether substantial doubt in fact exists.
To undertake the constitutional analysis, this Part creates a
test—the substantial doubt test—to measure whether government
actions have created substantial doubt about the validity of the public
debt. Like the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test under the
140
Fourth Amendment and the “evolving standards of decency”
141
component to Eighth Amendment review, the substantial doubt test
is a means internal to the textual provision to decipher the boundaries
of the constitutional command. It is not analogous to tests like strict
scrutiny or rational basis review, which apply in multiple
constitutional settings, but instead emphasizes the unique nature of
the specific guarantee under review. The test builds on the
interpretive conclusions in Part II.
A. Framework for the Substantial Doubt Test
The substantial doubt test is an attempt to implement the Public
Debt Clause’s prohibition on government actions that create
substantial doubt by focusing on two factors: (1) economic and
political indicators of macro-level instability, and (2) subjective
debtholder apprehension. The test is a tool to determine the point at
which
otherwise-permissible
government
action
becomes
unconstitutional. But it differs from traditional standards of review in
Clause should be read neither too narrowly, so as to eviscerate it, nor too broadly, so as to
forbid all irresponsible congressional actions).
140. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“Our later cases have . . . said
that a violation occurs when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring))).
141. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (“The Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”).
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a number of important respects. In particular, the Public Debt Clause
does not protect a fundamental right as conceptualized by the
142
Supreme Court and is therefore not amenable to the kind of review
143
characterized by, for instance, the strict scrutiny test. Furthermore,
144
because no individual right is implicated, the kind of balancing that
145
146
is characteristic of intermediate scrutiny, rational basis review, or
147
the undue burden test is unhelpful.
Instead, this Note emphasizes the utility of the substantial doubt
test not as a judicially imposed legal test—though it may have some
merit in that context as well—but as a standard by which other
constitutional decisionmakers, and the president in particular, can

142. The standard for recognizing these rights is high. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (stating that “fundamental rights” are rights that are “‘deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that
‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed’” (citation omitted) (quoting
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); and Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 320, 325 (1937))); see also Does v. Munoz, 507 F.3d 961, 964 (6th Cir.
2007) (“[I]dentifying a new fundamental right . . . is often an ‘uphill battle’ as the list of
fundamental rights ‘is short.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist.,
401 F.3d 381, 393 (6th Cir. 2005); and Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2000))). It
would be hard to argue, for instance, that having constitutional protection for your investments
is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Palko,
302 U.S. at 325) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (declining to apply the strict scrutiny test to rights not
deemed fundamental).
144. The Public Debt Clause protects the rights of a class of people—holders of U.S. debt—
in ways fundamentally different from other constitutional provisions. The right is a collective
right, much like the Second Amendment right was considered to be before the Supreme Court
declared otherwise in Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008); see also David
Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 588, 613 (2000) (“The essence of modern Second Amendment doctrine is that the
Amendment prohibits only statutes which interfere with the ‘preservation or efficiency’ of the
states’ militia. Some courts, in applying this doctrine, have referred to the Amendment as
creating a ‘collective right’; one court has even referred to the Second Amendment right as
being ‘held by the States.’” (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,
178 (1939); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); and Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d
98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996))).
145. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a
statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.”).
146. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“In areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes
fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is
any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.”).
147. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (“A finding of an
undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of [someone exercising a constitutional right].”).
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determine the constitutionality of government action. It is therefore
immaterial for the purposes of this Note that no individual would
149
likely have standing to sue for a violation of the Public Debt Clause
and that, furthermore, no private right of action would likely be

148. It is beyond the scope of this Note to outline the process by which the president or
other executive branch officials should determine whether the substantial doubt test is satisfied
in any given instance, and then, if they determine that it is, what to do about it. See supra notes
32–33 and accompanying text. For an excellent treatment of this kind of question, see generally
Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199
(1994).
149. For standing purposes, an individual must show that she has suffered an injury that has
been caused by the party whom she is suing and that a ruling in her favor would remedy the
injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). All three elements—injury,
causation, and remedy—appear to be problematic for a Public Debt Clause litigant. First, she
would need to prove the existence of a legally cognizable injury that is “not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical.’” Id. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). Here, she
could find it hard to prove that the value of her investment in public funds had actually
decreased in an appreciable way in the absence of a default or repudiation. Second, the causal
nexus between any specifiable government action and the loss to an individual plaintiff is likely
to be insubstantial at best. A dynamic and reinforcing sequence of action and inaction would
likely be responsible for the creation of substantial doubt, and it would be difficult to trace the
causal link. Finally, a writ of mandamus ordering the Treasury Secretary to raise the debt ceiling
is likely the only remedy that could effectively alleviate the complained-of harm. The judiciary
is unlikely to use this remedy, if they would have the power to do so at all. See Cheney v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (referring to the writ of mandamus as “a ‘drastic and
extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes’” and stating that “the writ is
one of ‘the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal’” (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258,
259–60 (1947); and Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967))).
The more pressing justiciability issue is not standing but the political question doctrine.
This doctrine is an especially potent restriction on the judiciary when important separation-ofpowers concerns are involved. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“[I]n the Guaranty
Clause cases and in the other ‘political question’ cases, it is the relationship between the
judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal
judiciary’s relationship to the States, which gives rise to the ‘political question.’”). Baker listed
several conditions under which a political question may be found: when there is
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217. The ability to raise the debt limit is entrusted to Congress by the Constitution—both
in giving Congress sole legislative authority and in giving it the power of the purse, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8; the decision to raise the debt limit involves a policy choice; and a mandamus
from the Court would likely indicate disrespect for the coordinate branches. These are but three
examples of reasons that the Public Debt Clause probably involves a nonjusticiable political
question.
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150

implied. Nor is it problematic that by the very nature of the
prohibition the Public Debt Clause might be declared nonjusticiable,
151
much like most claims arising under the Guaranty Clause.
The substantial doubt test is original, but is not fashioned from
whole cloth. Rather, as Part II argues, the Public Debt Clause
protects debt holders from precisely the kind of government actions
that create substantial doubt about the debt’s validity. The
implementation of the substantial doubt test thus follows directly
from the interpretation of the Public Debt Clause. And the two
components of the test are inextricably linked to the meaning of the
textual provisions. The test simply measures whether actions of the
federal government have made the validity of the debt sufficiently
uncertain to debt holders. If so, these actions are unconstitutional.
As psychologists and other researchers use the term, “[d]oubt—
the opposite of confidence— . . . is usually . . . understood to refer to
152
internal feelings of high uncertainty.” Doubt has been aptly
described as a kind of “emotional incoherence” in which an
emotional reaction is provoked by the lack of coherence between
153
some proposition and the rest of one’s beliefs. Thus, one would
doubt the proposition “the government is never going to miss a
payment on its debt” when that proposition is inconsistent with
background beliefs about the functioning of the economy, the nature
of political discourse, and other similar factors. Accordingly, “[a]n
increase in doubt increases consumers’ perceived risk” surrounding
154
the value of investments. Because doubt refers to “internal feelings

150. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (noting that in recent decades
the Court has “consistently refused to extend [liability under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),] to any new context or new category of
defendants”). Successful actions for damages for constitutional rights violations, when those
causes of action have not already been established, are therefore highly unlikely. A Public Debt
Clause litigant would thus have trouble receiving a financial remedy.
151. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) (“[S]ome questions raised under the
Guaranty Clause are nonjusticiable, where ‘political’ in nature and where there is a clear
absence of judicially manageable standards.” (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 209)).
152. Caroline J. Wesson & Briony D. Pulford, Verbal Expressions of Confidence and Doubt,
105 PSYCHOL. REP. 151, 152 (2009).
153. Paul Thagard, What Is Doubt and When Is It Reasonable?, 30 CAN. J. PHIL. 391, 393–94
(2004) (describing doubt as “emotional incoherence” as “people encounter[ing] a proposition or
set of propositions that d[oes] not fit with what they already believe[], and . . . react[ing]
emotionally as well as cognitively”).
154. Andrew B. Abel, An Exploration of the Effects of Pessimism and Doubt on Asset
Returns, 26 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1075, 1082 (2002).
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of high uncertainty,” it is an appropriate barometer to use. After all,
the Public Debt Clause was designed to protect recipients of the
156
government’s obligations from precisely this uncertainty. Because
the Public Debt Clause prohibits conduct that falls short of
repudiation or default, calculating the substantiality of the doubt
caused to debt holders is the best way to determine the
constitutionality of government action.
B. Factors in the Substantial Doubt Test
There are two critical indicia bearing on the question of
substantial doubt: (1) indications of the strength of the national
economy and the health of the political environment, and
(2) indications of apprehension felt by debt holders. The first
component is objective, focusing on data and statistics. The second is
157
subjective, emphasizing the “internal feelings” that debt holders
experience vis-à-vis the validity of the debt. These two factors are
consistent with the central purpose of the Public Debt Clause. The
possibility of the debt’s validity being questioned only materializes
158
under certain economic and political circumstances. In a period of
strong economic performance, a debtor nation has little reason to
default, and therefore there is little reason to think that anyone would
question the validity of the debt. It is when countries face difficult
economic times or unworkable political machinery that debt holders
fear not receiving timely payment.
The first component of this analysis looks to the economic and
political factors surrounding government action. Only when the
economic or political outlook is sufficiently negative is there a
159
plausible threat to the validity of the debt. Economic and political
research into sovereign debt explains several signals for default.
Though concerning conditions for default, this research is useful
because the substantial doubt with which the Public Debt Clause is

155. Wesson & Pulford, supra note 152, at 152.
156. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768–70 (1866) (statements of Sen. Benjamin
Wade).
157. Wesson & Pulford, supra note 152, at 152.
158. See generally Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Repudiation:
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 289 (1981) (emphasizing that default
becomes a plausible strategy as economic indicators worsen).
159. Id. But see generally Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, Do Countries Default in “Bad
Times”?, 5 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 352 (2007) (arguing that defaulting countries do not always
have bad economic conditions).

CHARLES IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

1252

2/25/2013 12:23 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1227

concerned is precisely doubt about the possibility of government
160
default, even though the doubt occurs before the default. The
presence of a significant number of these signals, although not
determinative, certainly strengthens an argument that the validity of
the debt has been placed in substantial doubt. Indeed, an analysis of
the political and economic context is appropriately considered a
threshold inquiry.
The analysis undertaken by credit-rating agencies sheds light on
the kinds of economic and political factors that are important to this
determination. Because “[s]overeign credit ratings are a condensed
assessment of a government’s ability and willingness to repay its
public debt on time,” these ratings are extremely important in
161
analyses of sovereign-default probabilities. The credit-rating agency
Standard & Poor’s relies on five different factors when rating
sovereign debt: (1) “[i]nstitutional effectiveness and political risks,”
(2) “[e]conomic structure and growth prospects,” (3) “[e]xternal
liquidity and international investment position,” (4) “[f]iscal
162
performance and flexibility,” and (5) “[m]onetary flexibility.” These
factors can be distilled into several main lines of inquiry, focusing on:
the political climate, including institutional design; the domestic
economic climate; and the domestic economy’s relation to the
international economy.
Like credit-rating agencies, economists also rely on institutional
163
effectiveness and political risk to predict default. Economists
160. The kind of doubt that the Public Debt Clause is concerned with is doubt about
whether the government will continue to meet its obligations. This is the kind of doubt that
Senator Wade spoke about in his description of the Public Debt Clause. See CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2769 (1866) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Wade) (“[My amendment] puts
the debt incurred in the civil war on our [the Union’s] part under the guardianship of the
Constitution of the United States, so that a Congress cannot repudiate it. I believe that to do
this will give great confidence to capitalists and will be of incalculable pecuniary benefit to the
United States . . . .”). Professor Jack Balkin outlined a similar kind of uncertainty in his analysis
of the Public Debt Clause’s legislative history. See Balkin, supra note 132 (“What do we learn
from this history? If Wade’s speech offers the central rationale for Section Four, the goal was to
remove threats of default on federal debts from partisan struggle.”).
161. António Afonso, Pedro Gomes & Philipp Rother, Short- and Long-Run Determinants
of Sovereign Debt Credit Ratings, 16 INT’L J. FIN. & ECON. 1, 1 (2011) (emphasis added).
162. STANDARD & POOR’S, SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT RATING METHODOLOGY AND
ASSUMPTIONS 4 (2011), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/
?articleType=PDF&assetID=1245310252210.
163. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez, The Politics of Sovereign Defaults, 96
FED. RES. BANK RICH. ECON. Q. 291, 308 (2010). See generally Jennifer M. Oetzel, Richard A.
Bettis & Marc Zenner, Country Risk Measures: How Risky Are They?, 36 J. WORLD BUS. 128
(2001) (discussing the use of the political-risk measure in analyzing country risk).
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characterize political risk as “the risk that arises from the potential
actions of governments and other influential domestic forces, which
164
threaten expected returns on investment.” Thus, when there is
contentious political infighting, or an indication that the machinery of
165
government is grinding to a halt, political risk is high. For instance,
the United States’ political risk would seem to be higher under a
166
divided government than under a united government. It would also
be higher when procedural impediments and political posturing,
caused by, for instance, intense interest group pressure, make
167
compromise difficult.
Sustained and persistent gridlock can,
168
likewise, create higher political risk.
The other types of default predictors used by economists concern
factors within the domestic economy and in the international context:
domestic economic performance and the country’s terms of trade and
169
borrowing costs. On the domestic front, countries that are about to
170
default have higher debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratios.
Importantly, however, “what matters is whether a country’s debt to
GDP [ratio] is high relative to its own mean, not whether it is high
171
relative to other countries.” If a country has a greater-than-typical
debt-to-GDP ratio, it is more likely that the country will default than
under alternative circumstances. On the international front, countries

164. Christopher M. Bilson, Timothy J. Brailsford & Vincent C. Hooper, The Explanatory
Power of Political Risk in Emerging Markets, 11 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2002).
165. See Afonso et al., supra note 161, at 2 (“Indicators of how the government conducts its
fiscal policy, in particular budget balance and government debt, can also be relevant, as well as
variables that assess political risk, such as corruption or social indexes.”).
166. See Gabriel Cuadra & Horacio Sapriza, Sovereign Default, Interest Rates and Political
Uncertainty in Emerging Markets, 76 J. INT’L ECON. 78, 88 (2008) (stating that “[c]ountries that
are subject to larger political uncertainty and stronger domestic disagreement” are seen as more
likely to default).
167. See, e.g., id. (“A body of empirical literature points out that high turnover rates/length
of tenure of policymakers and the degree of conflict within a country affect sovereign debt,
country spreads and default rates.”).
168. See id. at 79 (discussing how a higher “degree of polarization or disagreement among
different domestic groups” can increase the likelihood of default).
169. See, e.g., Hatchondo & Martinez, supra note 163, at 300 (summarizing literature that
establishes various relationships between political stability, macroeconomic conditions,
borrowing costs, and default risks).
170. Jens Hilscher & Yves Nosbusch, Determinants of Sovereign Risk 14 (Nov. 2004)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
171. Id. at 21.
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susceptible to default have higher volatility of terms of trade and
172
higher borrowing costs.
The preceding measures of economic uncertainty can be usefully
employed in the first component of the substantial doubt test. This is
not, of course, to say that a technical economic analysis needs to be
undertaken when analyzing the Public Debt Clause. It is only to say
that a questioning of the debt is more likely to happen, perhaps only
likely to happen, under conditions of economic and political
uncertainty. When those conditions are present, certain governmental
actions that may be permissible at other times are more likely to
cause substantial doubt and therefore violate the Public Debt Clause.
In assessing whether government actions are unconstitutional, then, a
decisionmaker, such as the president, must broadly assess the
economic and political context in which those actions take place.
Importantly, either a sufficiently poor economic condition or a
sufficiently negative political environment could at times provide the
right conditions for substantial doubt. When both occur
simultaneously, the likelihood that subjective apprehension will occur
is much greater.
The second component of the substantial doubt test focuses on
173
context-specific indications of debtholder apprehension.
This
inquiry is integral to the accuracy of overall determinations about the
174
but, because of its
constitutionality of government actions,
subjective nature, requires the use of reliable proxies for debtholder
uncertainty. One proxy is “whether any rating service ha[s]
175
downgraded the debt.” Also relevant is whether any of the credit176
rating agencies have issued a warning about the debt. Certainly the
right political and economic preconditions are relevant, and perhaps
necessary, but they will likely never be sufficient. What really matters
is whether debt holders question the validity of the debt. By looking
172. Jens Hilscher & Yves Nosbusch, Determinants of Sovereign Risk: Macroeconomic
Fundamentals and the Pricing of Sovereign Debt, 14 REV. FIN. 235, 258 (2010).
173. See Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 569 (“[C]ourt[s] would need to address whether a
questioned congressional action ‘could place its ability to honor such debts in doubt.’ In the
1990s, it is possible that no government action would place the government’s ability to honor
debts in doubt because the government’s credit rating is so high, but the courts would need to
develop tests to identify when the government lost this ability.”).
174. See generally Lars Peter Hansen, Beliefs, Doubts and Learning: Valuing
Macroeconomic Risk, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2007) (explaining the importance of identifying
subjective uncertainty and doubt in undertaking economic analysis).
175. Abramowicz, supra note 29, at 569.
176. See id. at 570 n.33 (highlighting the issuance of debt warnings as an objective standard).
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to these proxies, a decisionmaker can tell whether the market
envisions the government’s action to be such a substantial variation
from prior practice that there is a credible possibility that the
government will fail to meet its obligations. Absent an actual
downgrade or a warning from a rating agency, other indicators can be
relevant to debt holders’ states of mind, such as press commentary,
historical indices, statistical studies, reactions of world markets,
interest rates, and anything else that offers evidence of debt holders’
177
subjective doubts about the validity of the public debt.
Therefore, in weighing whether some action generates
substantial doubt, a decisionmaker would need to ask a number of
questions under the two-pronged substantial doubt test. First, do the
economic and political indicators suggest that the atmosphere is ripe
for default? Second, has a rating agency issued a warning or
downgraded the nation’s credit rating, or are there other indications
that debt holders substantially doubt whether the government will
meet its obligations? These factors are no more abstruse or difficult
to apply than determining, for instance, whether the government has
178
a sufficiently “compelling interest” to take some action. In the same
way that it would be difficult to apply the strict scrutiny test in the
abstract, however, a fuller analysis of the merits of the substantial
doubt test can be seen in its application to scenarios of potential
questioning surrounding the increased hostility during in debt-limit
debates.
IV. VIOLATIONS OF THE PUBLIC DEBT CLAUSE: APPLYING THE
SUBSTANTIAL DOUBT TEST
The substantial doubt test determines how close to the edge of
default congressional obstructionism must be for the conduct to be
179
There is no bright line or dollar amount
unconstitutional.
commanded by the substantial doubt test, so historical scenarios best
illustrate the implementation of the test. To show how the substantial
doubt test can be applied, this Part first analyzes the 1995–96 and

177. See id. (“The subjective standard . . . could be assessed using a multi-factorial test, in
which a judicial fact-finder might consider bond ratings, stock and bond prices, statistical
studies, newspaper commentary, and testimony by debt-holders.”).
178. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 932–37 (1988) (discussing
the difficulty of deciding what state interests qualify as “compelling”).
179. See supra Part III.
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2011 debt-limit debates and concludes that Congress’s actions
violated the Public Debt Clause by creating substantial doubt about
the validity of the debt. Next, it examines the 2002 debt-limit debate
and shows how even contentious political infighting can be
constitutionally permissible under the Public Debt Clause.
Because most debt debates will not involve an unconstitutional
creation of substantial doubt, the 2002 debate is representative of
these contentious yet constitutionally acceptable debates. And, for
just that reason, this Part also singles out the results of two debates to
illustrate the variety of unconstitutional conduct. This Part analyzes
the two unconstitutional episodes side-by-side both to show the
similarities between types of unconstitutional doubt creation and to
more easily contrast the context of these debates with the factors
characteristic of actions taken during constitutionally permissible
policy disputes.
A. Unconstitutional Obstructionism: The 1995–96 Showdown
One of the most memorable debt-limit clashes was President
180
Clinton’s 1995–96 showdown with a hostile Congress. Unafraid to
“waive the Gephardt Rule[, which was] designed to provide political
cover on debt limit votes,” congressional Republicans confronted the
181
administration’s request for an increase in the debt limit head-on.
182
The extended debate—which lasted almost six months —was
precipitated by the rise of the Newt Gingrich-led Republican House
183
majority and its staunch fiscal conservatism.
When analysts
determined that the Treasury would reach the statutory limit by the
end of October 1995, Republicans in Congress were adamant about
refusing to increase the limit without serious concessions from the
184
president. The administration, on the other hand, was not willing to
180. See Krishnakumar, supra note 4, at 156 (“[I]n 1995, the Gingrich-led 104th Congress
openly and brazenly sought to use legislation increasing the debt ceiling to force President
Clinton to accept sweeping reforms, including a seven-year plan to balance the budget . . . .”).
181. Id.
182. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-96-130, DEBT CEILING: ANALYSIS OF
ACTIONS DURING THE 1995–1996 CRISIS 19 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
1996/ai96130.pdf.
183. See Patrice Hill, Default on National Debt Payment Looms with Gingrich Budget
Threat, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at A8 (“House Speaker Newt Gingrich, with backing from
freshman Republicans and GOP deficit hawks intent on balancing the budget, has said he will
not allow Congress to pass an increase in the Treasury’s debt limit unless President Clinton
signs a budget that will balance by 2002.”).
184. See supra note 183.
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accept the massive spending reductions and the requirement of a
185
balanced budget that Republicans were demanding. After two
186
separate government shutdowns in late 1995 and early 1996, the
debt-limit crisis “was resolved on March 29, 1996, when Congress
187
raised the debt ceiling to $5.5 trillion.”
Applying the substantial doubt test, this Section argues that the
shutdown-producing congressional actions during the 1995–96
debates were unconstitutional under the Public Debt Clause. First,
the political climate was extremely divisive. In the 1994 election,
“[t]he Republican Party won a majority of the votes cast for Congress
188
for the first time since 1946.” After the election, Republicans
controlled both houses of Congress and faced a hostile chief executive
189
in President Clinton. The two branches were set to collide over
disagreements on the debt, with “Gingrich and his budget-cutting
revolutionaries steaming in from one direction, [and] Clinton and his
190
veto rolling in from the other.” Although the political context
portended interminable conflict, the economy was in good shape—
and its prospects were brightening as “the high-tech-driven economic
191
boom of the late 1990s” promised to bring further financial
prosperity. Even though the economic outlook was positive, this
intense political conflict was sufficiently acrimonious to open the door
for substantial doubt from debt holders. And the subjective indicators
of debt-holder apprehension demonstrate that this was precisely their
reaction.
The second factor in the substantial doubt test, the debt-holdersubjectivity element, indicates that the 1995–96 debate created
substantial doubt about the debt’s validity. During the closing months
of 1995, “Republicans freely dispensed threats to shut down the

185. See David E. Sanger, G.O.P. Gives Dual Message on Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
1995, at A22 (“Mr. Clinton has vowed to veto that budget . . . .”).
186. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution: The
Anatomy of the 1995–96 Budget “Train Wreck,” 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 607–09 (1998)
(recounting the government shutdowns).
187. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 182, at 19.
188. Curtis Gans, 1994 Congressional Elections: An Analysis, FAIRVOTE, http://
archive.fairvote.org/reports/1995/chp3/gans.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
189. Id.
190. Krishnakumar, supra note 186, at 589 (quoting DAVID MARANISS & MICHAEL
WEISSKOPF, “TELL NEWT TO SHUT UP!” 149 (1996)).
191. YARROW, supra note 20, at 46.
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192

government and throw it into default.” These threats were taken
seriously enough for the public in general, and debt holders in
193
particular, to be worried about default. In fact, because the creditrating agency was “[a]larmed that the budget negotiations in
Washington might lead to an unprecedented default on the $4.9
trillion national debt, Moody’s issued an unusually severe warning to
194
the U.S. government.” Additionally, Standard & Poor’s “warned
that ‘the global capital market’s unquestioned faith in the United
States government’s willingness to honor its financial obligations has,
to some degree, been diminished by the failure of the government to
195
act in a timely fashion.’” These warnings by top credit-rating
agencies indicated the degree to which debt holders feared that the
government might miss payments on its obligations. There was a
general awareness that the divisiveness created by the stalemate was
qualitatively different from other debates and that congressional
wielding of this potent “weapon” might harm future economic
196
interests of the debt holders.
Added to these downgrade warnings was a noticeable market
reaction to the debt-limit gridlock. After an extensive analysis of
bond prices throughout the crisis, economists Srinivas Nippani, Pu
Liu, and Craig T. Schulman concluded that “a potential Treasury
default occurred in 1995–1996 when the U.S. President and Congress
197
disagreed on passing a balanced budget bill.” Their conclusion was
based on the fact that the market charged a “default premium” on
Treasury securities during the period in which the conflict was
198
occurring. These default premiums are only charged when there is
192. Budget Showdown Looms; U.S. Borrowing Authority Extended Until March 29, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 1996, at A8.
193. See Hill, supra note 183 (recording the fear and potential effects of default and stating
that “[t]he hostile reaction in the financial markets last week to Mr. Gingrich’s threat to permit
a default suggests that the price of default would indeed be higher interest rates,” because
“[w]ithin a day, the interest rates on 30-year Treasury bond had risen from 6.46 percent to 6.62
percent”).
194. Deadlock Spurs Warning on Debt, REC.- J., Jan. 28, 1996, at E1.
195. Clay Chandler, S&P Worried by Budget Impasse; Credit Rating Agency Says Global
Faith in U.S. Is Diminished, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1995, at D1 (quoting Standard & Poor’s
credit warning).
196. Cf., e.g., Adam Clymer, G.O.P. Lawmakers Offer To Abandon Debt-Limit Threat, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at A1 (discussing the contentious months of debate about raising the debt
limit).
197. Srinivas Nippani, Pu Liu & Craig T. Schulman, Are Treasury Securities Free of
Default?, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 251, 263 (2001).
198. Id.

CHARLES IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/25/2013 12:23 PM

THE DEBT LIMIT AND THE CONSTITUTION

1259

enough evidence for the market to reasonably infer that there is a
199
credible possibility of default. The market thus envisioned the 1995–
96 debate as sufficiently hostile to produce substantial doubt about
the validity of the U.S. debt.
The bitterly divided political environment, coupled with ample
indications of substantial doubt among debt holders, leads to the
conclusion that the 1995–96 debate caused an unconstitutional
questioning of the public debt. As Professor Anita Krishnakumar has
noted, “This extraordinary breakdown in budget-making, while
unprecedented in scope and degree, was not the first, nor is it likely to
200
be the last ‘train wreck’ of its kind.” Indeed, this Note argues that
the unconstitutional 1995–96 “train wreck” was paralleled—and in
fact surpassed—by the 2011 debt debate.
B. Unconstitutional Brinkmanship: The 2011 Debt-Limit Debate
The 2011 debt-limit debate began in January 2011 after Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner sent a letter to Senate Majority Leader
201
Harry Reid requesting an increase in the debt limit. This letter
expressed Geithner’s belief that the debt would reach the limit at
202
some time between March 31 and May 16, 2011, though his later,
final estimate indicated that August 2 was the absolute latest date
203
that the limit could be reached. Until this date, the Treasury entered
a debt-issuance suspension period and engaged in a number of
204
extraordinary measures —similar to those undertaken in years

199. Id.
200. Krishnakumar, supra note 186, at 590.
201. Letter from Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, to Harry Reid, Majority
Leader, U.S. Senate 1 (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/
Documents/Letter.pdf; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-701, DEBT
LIMIT: ANALYSIS OF 2011–2012 ACTIONS TAKEN AND EFFECT OF DELAYED INCREASE ON
BORROWING COSTS 9 tbl.2 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592832.pdf (listing
Geithner’s letter as the first event in the debt-crisis chronology).
202. Letter from Timothy Geithner to Harry Reid, supra note 201, at 1.
203. Letter from Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, to Harry Reid, Majority
Leader, U.S. Senate 1 (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/
Documents/20110516Letter%20to%20Congress.pdf.
204. During a debt-issuance suspension period, defined as “any period for which the
Secretary of the Treasury determines for purposes of this subsection that the issuance of
obligations of the United States may not be made without exceeding the public debt limit,” 5
U.S.C. § 8348(j)(5)(B) (2006), the Treasury Secretary can engage in technical accounting
measures to keep the debt below the limit, id. § 8348(k); see also AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 6,
at 5 n.26 (“After a debt issuance suspension period ends, the Treasury Secretary must report to
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205

With the
past—to keep the debt below the statutory limit.
government on the brink of default, the House and Senate passed a
206
compromise measure that was signed into law on August 2, 2011,
the very day that the Treasury estimated it would be unable to
207
continue meeting its fiscal obligations.
Though this debt debate shared many facial similarities with
previous, routine debates, application of the substantial doubt test
suggests that it was different for a number of reasons. First, the
macroeconomic indicators signified a substantially weaker climate
than in prior years. The public debt was an estimated 94.3 percent of
GDP at the end of the 2010 fiscal year and would eventually reach 99
percent of GDP by September 30, 2011, the end of the 2011 fiscal
208
year. To provide context, before the end of the 2009 fiscal year, the
public debt had not even reached 70 percent of GDP for the preceding
209
fifty-five years. Furthermore, in 2011 the U.S. economy had seen
one of the largest GDP shrinkages in decades—negative economic
growth of 2.6 percent in 2009 due to a recession from which the
210
country was still recovering. Total GDP shrinkage stood at “4.1%,
211
marking the deepest recession since 1947.”
These macroeconomic indicators were not the only harbingers of
substantial doubt. The U.S. political situation was also deeply divided
following the 2010 midterm elections. Republicans controlled the
House of Representatives, while Democrats held the Senate and the
212
presidency. The rising “Tea Party” movement sought to introduce
213
intense fiscal conservatism into debt-limit debates. Many of these
Congress as soon as possible regarding fund balances and any extraordinary actions taken.”); 5
U.S.C. § 8348(j)–(k) (specifying the actions to be taken by the Treasury Secretary).
205. See AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 6, at 18–21 (describing serial increases in the debt
limit).
206. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (to be codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901a, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3101A).
207. Letter from Timothy Geithner to Harry Reid, supra note 203, at 1.
208. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 134 tbl.7.1.
209. Id. at 133–34 tbl.7.1.
210. See Hibah Yousuf, U.S. Recovery Sputters, CNN MONEY (July 30, 2010, 12:35 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/30/news/economy/gdp (describing the 2007 economic downturn
and slow recovery).
211. Id.
212. Campaign 2010, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/election2010/?tag=contentMain;
contentBody (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
213. See Kate Zernike & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Finds Tea Party Backers Wealthier and
More Educated, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, at A1 (remarking that most Tea Party members
desired a smaller government above all else).
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newly elected Tea Party Republicans took a hard line during debates
214
on the debt limit. Even more alarming, in early June, some
215
Republicans were starting to call for a “technical default” as the
216
price to pay for compromise.
Layered on top of these poor macroeconomic and political
factors, “[a] surprise warning about U.S. debt by credit-rating agency
Standard & Poor’s [on April 18] sent stocks plunging . . . and
crystallized the threat that mounting federal budget deficits and
national debt pose to the U.S. financial system and the American way
217
of life.” In its warning about U.S. debt, Standard & Poor’s indicated
its shock that “more than two years after the beginning of the recent
crisis, U.S. policymakers have still not agreed on a strategy to reverse
218
recent fiscal deterioration or address longer-term fiscal pressures.”
On July 13, 2011, Moody’s Investor Services, another major creditrating agency, also warned the U.S. that its debt could be subject to
219
downgrade if systemic changes were not made. And Fitch Ratings,
the third major credit-rating agency, followed suit with a similar
220
warning on July 17.
The degree of intractable political debate, fear among debt
holders, and overall depressed economic conditions caused credit-

214. Huma Kahn, Debt Ceiling Debate Heats Up, Tea Party Says “Hell No” to Raising Limit,
ABC NEWS (May 16, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/debt-ceiling-debate-heats-tea-partyhell-raising/story?id=13597695 (“Many of these [Republican] members, buoyed by the Tea
Party, argue they will not agree to raising the debt limit if their demands of major spending
reductions are not met. Members of the Tea Party argue that claims about the repercussions of
not raising the limit are over-hyped and simply ‘fear mongering.’”).
215. Froma Harrop, GOP Plays Chicken with Debt Default, PROVIDENCE J., May 25, 2011,
at B7.
216. See Tim Reid & Steven C. Johnson, Republican Mainstream Flirts with Brief Default,
REUTERS (June 7, 2011, 11:01 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/08/us-usa-debtskepticism-idUSTRE75700720110608 (“An idea once confined to the fringe of the Republican
party is seeping into its mainstream—that a brief default might be an acceptable price to pay if it
forces the White House to deal with runaway spending.”).
217. Kevin G. Hall, Why S&P’s Warning on U.S. Debt Matters, MCCLATCHY (Apr.
18, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/04/18/112369/why-sps-warning-on-us-debt-matters
.html#ixzz1crNqJf5r.
218. STANDARD & POOR’S, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ‘AAA/A-1+’ RATING
AFFIRMED; OUTLOOK REVISED TO NEGATIVE 3 (2011), available at www.ft.com/cms/6503e6fe69c0-11e0-826b-00144feab49a.pdf.
219. John Detrixhe & Daniel Kruger, Moody’s Downgrade Warning Adds Pressure on U.S.
Debt Deal, BLOOMBERG (July 14, 2011, 10:44 AM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201107-13/u-s-debt-rating-placed-on-review-for-downgrade-by-moody-s-as-talks-stall.html.
220. Jennifer Epstein, Fitch: AAA Rating in Jeopardy, POLITICO (July 18, 2011, 1:43 PM
EDT), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0711/59273.html.
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rating agency Standard & Poor’s to downgrade the U.S. debt for the
first time in history—and this occurred even after a compromise had
221
been reached. The agency said that it downgraded U.S. debt
“because [it] believe[d] that the prolonged controversy over raising
the statutory debt ceiling and the related fiscal policy debate indicate
that further near-term progress . . . is less likely than we previously
222
assumed and will remain a contentious and fitful process.”
These same factors—a bitterly divided political environment,
coupled with the numerous indications of substantial uncertainty
among debt holders in an overall abysmal financial atmosphere—
indicate that Congress’s actions during the 2011 debt-limit debate
created substantial doubt about the validity of the public debt. Under
the first prong of the substantial doubt test, the economic and
political contexts sufficiently elevated the possibility of default. And
under the second prong, as illustrated by the reaction of the rating
agencies, debt holders suffered great doubt about the validity of the
national debt. Congressional actions—including posturing, rhetoric,
and a failure to more expeditiously resolve the debt-limit impasse—
during the 2011 debate were, in other words, unconstitutional under
the Public Debt Clause. But this kind of unconstitutional conduct,
though certainly a cause for concern, is not the norm for debt-limit
increases.
C. A Constitutional Policy Dispute: The 2002 Debt-Limit Debate
In late 2001, toward the end of President George W. Bush’s first
223
year in office, the national debt was approaching the statutory limit.
This was in spite of the four years of budget surpluses from fiscal year
224
1998 through fiscal year 2001. Though the debt was within a mere
$25 million of the limit at the beginning of 2002, the Treasury used
technical accounting measures to keep the debt below the limit until

221. See generally STANDARD & POOR’S, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LONG-TERM
RATING LOWERED TO ‘AA+’ ON POLITICAL RISKS AND RISING DEBT BURDEN; OUTLOOK
NEGATIVE (2011), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/af2c4fac-bfc2-11e0-90d5-00144feabdc0
.pdf (detailing the rationales for the downgrade).
222. Id. at 3.
223. See AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 6, at 13 (“In the fall of 2001, the Administration
recognized that a deteriorating budget outlook and continued growth in debt held by
government accounts were likely to lead to the debt limit soon being reached.”).
224. See PHILLIP D. WINTERS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21111, THE DEBT LIMIT: THE
NEED TO RAISE IT AFTER FOUR YEARS OF SURPLUSES 1 (2003) (“The surpluses over the four
fiscal years (1998–2001) reduced debt held by the public by $448 billion.”).

CHARLES IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/25/2013 12:23 PM

THE DEBT LIMIT AND THE CONSTITUTION

1263

225

the April 15 tax revenues came in. By mid-May 2002, however, the
226
debt had climbed back to within $15 million of the debt limit. The
Treasury was again forced to use extraordinary measures to keep the
debt below the limit, and it estimated that the government could not
227
meet its obligations—without an increase—after June 28, 2002. The
Senate then passed legislation increasing the debt limit on June 11
228
without any debate. The House, on the brink of default, passed the
229
debt limit increase by a single vote on June 27. The legislation was
signed into law on June 28, the day the Treasury had estimated that
230
the government would be unable to meet its obligations.
Though the national debt was extremely close to the debt limit, it
does not appear that any of Congress’s actions put the debt into
substantial doubt. First, under the substantial doubt test,
macroeconomic factors indicated that the nation’s economy was not
conducive to default. For example, debt as a percentage of GDP was
only 56.4 percent on September 30, 2001, and 58.8 percent on
231
September 30, 2002. Comparatively, this ratio was similar to what it
232
had been for the previous decade; indeed, it was slightly lower.
Second, economic growth, as measured by annual GDP percentage
increase, was approximately 2.45 percent from 2001 to 2002—an
233
increase within the normal range of GDP increases.
The
macroeconomic indicators therefore did not give cause for concern.
Similarly, the political environment was not conducive to default.
As a result of the 2000 elections, the Republicans had control of the
House of Representatives and possessed the tie-breaking vote in the
225. AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 6, at 13.
226. Id. at 14.
227. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-134, DEBT CEILING: ANALYSIS OF
ACTIONS DURING THE 2002 DEBT ISSUANCE SUSPENSION PERIODS 8 (2002) (reporting that on
May 14, 2002, “[t]he Secretary of the Treasury declared a debt issuance suspension period” and
that on June 18, 2002, the Treasury Secretary “announced that by June 28, 2002, the U.S.
government would not have sufficient money to pay its bills unless the debt ceiling was
increased”).
228. AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 6, at 14.
229. Id.
230. Act of June 28, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-199, 116 Stat. 734 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 3101(b) (Supp. IV 2011)) (increasing the public debt limit to $6.4 trillion), amended by
Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112- 25, 125 Stat. 240.
231. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 134.
232. See, e.g., id. at 133–34 (reporting that debt as a percentage of GDP remained above 60
percent for most of the 1990s).
233. Historical Data Graphs per Year, INDEX MUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/
g.aspx?c=us&v=66 (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
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Senate, which, after the election, was split 50–50. They also, of
235
course, controlled the presidency. Under a united government, the
236
odds of default are certainly less than otherwise.
Finally, other subjective indications were likewise not
emblematic of debt-holder concern. No major credit-rating agency
issued a warning or downgraded the nation’s credit rating, and all
signs indicated that “[n]o one believed a federal default would
237
actually occur.” Indeed, the debate itself was more a political
calculation on the part of Democrats to extract extraneous favors by
withholding votes rather than a principled stand against increased
government indebtedness of the kind that creates debtholder
238
uncertainty.
These factors indicate that the 2002 debt-limit debate, though
fierce, did not generate substantial doubt about the validity of the
public debt and was, therefore, not unconstitutional. Congress did not
violate the Public Debt Clause even though it waited until the last
minute to raise the debt limit. The macroeconomic indicators
suggested a sufficiently strong economy, the political division was not
partisan enough to create the conditions for a plausible default, and
the subjective factors showed that debt holders did not realistically
fear a government default. That the vote was so close and Congress
waited until the last minute to raise the limit—and yet no one
questioned the debt—shows the futility of trying to make a bright-line
test for violations of the Public Debt Clause. In 2002, the debt was
within $15 million dollars of the ceiling—an amount that “equaled
239
about five minutes of federal outlays.” Yet because no substantial

234. JEFF TRANDAHL, CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 7, 2000, at 79 (2001), available
at clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/2000election.pdf. Republicans controlled the
House by a margin of 221–212. Id.
235. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam) (ending recount efforts in the
state of Florida, effectively declaring George W. Bush president).
236. See Cuadra & Sapriza, supra note 166, at 88 (explaining that “[c]ountries that are
subject to larger political uncertainty and stronger domestic disagreement” are seen as more
likely to default).
237. GOP Pushes $450 Billion Debt Limit Increase Through, USA TODAY (June 27, 2002,
11:14 PM ET), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washdc/2002/06/28/debtlimit.htm.
238. See id. (“As House GOP leaders spent weeks hunting fruitlessly for votes [to increase
the debt limit], Democrats offered to supply them. But as a trade-off, they were demanding
higher spending on the anti-terrorism bill and in next year’s budget, plus overall budget talks
that Republicans feared could have resulted in revisiting next year’s tax cut.”).
239. AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 6, at 14 (emphasis added).
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doubt was created concerning government payment, there was no
constitutional violation.
The substantial doubt test—at least no more than any other
constitutional test—is not an arbitrary test that can be manipulated
based on the policy preferences of the decisionmaker. It can be
applied in a principled way by analyzing observable and objective
data surrounding debt-limit debates and by determining whether debt
holders have experienced substantial doubt about the continuing
validity of the obligations that are owed to them. When this
substantial doubt occurs, the Public Debt Clause has been violated.
CONCLUSION
240

With the national debt spiraling out of control and the
241
economic recovery stagnant, greater hostility and contention will
242
likely accompany future debt-limit increases. The combination of
243
244
unavoidable increases —caused by deepening budget deficits —and
consolidated opposition—caused by the revitalization of intense fiscal
245
conservatism —makes the Public Debt Clause more relevant today
than ever before.
Every indication suggests that the increasing vehemence
246
surrounding debt-limit legislation will continue indefinitely. Some
240. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-521SP, THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT’S LONG-TERM FISCAL OUTLOOK, SPRING 2012 UPDATE 1 (2012), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589835.pdf (“A continuing increase in debt as a share of GDP
means the federal government is on an unsustainable long-term fiscal path and underscores the
need for policymakers to act to change the path.”).
241. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS
2012 TO 2022, at xi (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/01-31-2012_Outlook.pdf (projecting that “[a]lthough . . . growth will pick up after
2013, the agency expects that the economy’s output will remain below its potential until 2018”).
242. Richard Cowan & Rachelle Younglai, U.S. Congress May Face Another Debt-Limit
Showdown in 2013, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2012, 2:39 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/10/28/us-usa-congress-debtceiling-idUSBRE89R0G520121028 (“A U.S. debt-ceiling
increase could be headed for a Wall Street-rattling showdown in 2013 if Congress, as expected,
shuns a quick and easy fix at the end of this year in favor of another round of last-minute
brinksmanship.”).
243. See AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 6, at 25 (“Unless federal policies change, Congress
w[ill] repeatedly face demands to raise the debt limit to accommodate the growing federal debt
in order to provide the government with the means to meet its financial obligations.”).
244. See U.S. GOV’T SPENDING, http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/federal_deficit_
chart.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (recording the increasing budget deficits from the 2007
fiscal year through the 2013 fiscal year).
245. See Harrop, supra note 215 (discussing calls for default among Republicans).
246. See id. (noting increasing Republican opposition to future increases to the debt limit).
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of these debates will be contentious, even hostile, but still
247
constitutional. Others, those that create substantial doubt about the
248
validity of the debt, will be unconstitutional. Directed by welldefined constitutional guideposts, the president should disregard the
debt limit when congressional obstructionism rises to the level of
creating substantial doubt about the continuing validity of the public
debt.

247. See supra Part IV.C.
248. See supra Part IV.A–B.

